

Understanding Swap Pricing and Calculating Risk

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
Swap Math and Procurement

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Swap Financial Group

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Swap overview



Basic math: swaps vs. bonds

Bonds

- ✓ Fixed coupon
- ✓ + Amortized cost of issuance

✓ = All-in cost

Swap

- ✓ Floating bond rate
- ✓ + Annual costs of floaters (remarketing/liquidity, auction fees)
- ✓ + Fixed swap rate
- ✓ – Floating swap rate

✓ = All-in cost

Plug in some numbers

Bonds

- ✓ 4.34% (fixed coupon)
- ✓ + 0.05% (amortized cost of issuance)

✓ = 4.39% (all-in cost)

Swap


- ✓ VR% (floating bond rate)
- ✓ + 0.26% (remarketing and liquidity or auction)
- ✓ + 3.49% (fixed swap rate)
- ✓ – VR% (floating swap rate)

✓ = 3.75% (all-in cost)

Why does it work?


- Counter-intuitive: Why should three steps (issue floating, receive floating, pay fixed) be more efficient than one (issue fixed)
- Swaps allow you to “unbundle” and take advantage of relative efficiencies of different markets
- Market sensitive: It doesn't always work

Building blocks of swap pricing



■ 30yr BMA swap example

- Actual component values will vary widely based on deal specifics



■ What is “mid-market”?

- Hypothetical rate for swap if no profit or costs
- Supposedly the “objective” rate that all parties can agree on
- Calculated by averaging bid and offered rates
 - Bloomberg screen for 30-year BMA swap:
 - Bid: 3.95%, Offer: 4.06%
 - Thus, mid-market is 4.005%


BMA swap quotes

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Term	Bid	Ask	Time	Bid	Ask	Time	
Percentage of Libor vs BMA Muni Index				Quarterly Bond Rate vs BMA Muni Index			
1Y	1) 65.38	68.38	2/09	12)	3.52	3.68	2/09
2Y	2) 66.00	69.00	2/09	13)	3.46	3.61	2/09
3Y	3) 66.38	69.38	2/09	14)	3.44	3.59	2/09
4Y	4) 66.75	69.75	2/09	15)	3.45	3.60	2/09
5Y	5) 67.25	70.25	2/09	16)	3.48	3.63	2/09
7Y	6) 68.75	70.75	2/09	17)	3.58	3.68	2/09
10Y	7) 69.88	71.88	2/09	18)	3.68	3.78	2/09
12Y	8) 70.50	72.50	2/09	19)	3.74	3.84	2/09
15Y	9) 71.13	73.13	2/09	20)	3.80	3.91	2/09
20Y	10) 72.13	74.13	2/09	21)	3.88	3.99	2/09
30Y	11) 73.25	75.25	2/09	22)	3.95	4.06	2/09


LIBOR swap quotes

GovPX/ICAP SwapPX		US Medium Term Swaps vs 3M LIBOR	
Term	TrPrice	TrYld	SwapSpd-SA SA (30/360)
2Y	99.300/304	4.908 /899	34.75 38.75 5.251 /291
3Y	99.264/270	4.812 /807	37.75 41.75 5.187 /227
4Y	99.284/290	4.794 /789	38.50 42.50 5.176 /216
5Y		4.775 /771	41.25 45.25 5.186 /226
6Y		4.777 /773	42.50 46.50 5.200 /240
7Y		4.779 /775	44.25 48.25 5.219 /259
8Y		4.780 /776	46.00 50.00 5.239 /279
9Y	98.240/250	4.782 /778	47.75 51.75 5.258 /298
10Y		4.784 /780	49.75 53.75 5.280 /320
11Y		4.784 /780	51.50 55.50 5.297 /337
12Y		4.784 /780	53.25 57.25 5.315 /355
13Y		4.784 /780	55.00 59.00 5.332 /372
14Y	98.054/064	4.784 /780	56.25 60.25 5.345 /385
15Y		4.805 /801	55.75 59.75 5.360 /400
20Y		4.825 /822	57.25 61.25 5.396 /436
25Y		4.845 /843	56.50 60.50 5.409 /449
30Y		4.866 /864	54.50 58.50 5.410 /450



■ Problems with mid-market

- Moving markets are often not reflected on screens (especially BMA)
- Capability of advisor/issuer in modeling
- Different models can produce different results with non-vanilla transactions (especially swaps with embedded options)



■ Dealer spread components

■ Hedging cost

- Varies by index, product type, even by dealer

■ Credit reserve cost

- Required for all credit exposures
- Varies somewhat by dealer
- Spread between different credits can vary over time

■ Profit

- Evolving practices, no real standard
- Spread will often be larger for small deals and for deals that consume a large amount of time

Calculating mid-market rate

Notional: \$100 million (non-amortizing)

Trade Date: 3/7/2007

Effective Date: 4/1/2007

Termination Date: 4/1/2009

Fixed leg: _____%
(Semi-annual payments, 30/360 daycount fraction)

Floating leg: 6-month USD LIBOR
(Semi-annual payments, Actual/360)

- Mid-market swap rate is the rate at which the discounted future values of the fixed and floating swap payments net to zero

Swap cashflows

Date	Days	Floating Rate Payment	Fixed Rate Payment
4/1/2007	0	none	none
10/1/2007	183	$6ML_0 \times 183/360 \times \100mm	$\text{-Fixed\%} \times 180/360 \times \100mm
4/1/2008	183	$6ML_1 \times 183/360 \times \100mm	$\text{-Fixed\%} \times 180/360 \times \100mm
10/1/2008	183	$6ML_2 \times 183/360 \times \100mm	$\text{-Fixed\%} \times 180/360 \times \100mm
4/1/2009	182	$6ML_3 \times 182/360 \times \100mm	$\text{-Fixed\%} \times 180/360 \times \100mm

- Payments are made at the end of each period
- LIBOR rates are determined 2 London business days prior to the start of each period (as per ISDA convention)
- Thus, the first 6-month LIBOR setting ($6ML_0$) is determined on (3/29/07)
- Only net payment is exchanged on payment dates (according to appropriate business day convention)

Calculating mid-market rate

- Swap can be decomposed into two parts:
 - Fixed rate bond paying fixed swap rate
 - Floating rate note (FRN) paying LIBOR
- To estimate the NPV of the swap, we need the PV of each leg (fixed and floating)
- LIBOR rates are derived from the forward curve
- Principal repayments at maturity cancel out
- Solve for the swap rate where the PV of the future cashflows for the FRN equal those of the bond

Floating leg

- FRN cashflows valued using forward curve
 - Use forward LIBOR rates to generate cashflows
 - Discount back using corresponding discount factors
 - This gives the NPV of the floating side
- Forward rates are market perception of future spot rates
 - Historically, not a good predictor
 - Dealers can hedge off forward rates
 - Using Eurodollar futures, FRAs, swaps etc.

Floating leg (con't)

- Calculate floating leg NPV
 - Discount factors and forward rates are derived from the yield curve

Date	Days	DF	Forward DF	Forward Rate	Cashflows	PV Cashflows
4/1/2007	0	0.996396				
10/1/2007	183	0.969473	0.972980	5.4630%	2,777,024.22	2,692,250.00
4/1/2008	183	0.944098	0.973826	5.2874%	2,687,750.64	2,537,500.00
10/1/2008	183	0.920633	0.975145	5.0141%	2,548,845.49	2,346,550.00
4/1/2009	182	0.897167	0.974512	5.1735%	2,615,510.82	2,346,550.00
					NPV:	9,922,850.00

Fixed leg

- Solve for the fixed rate that produces same NPV as the floating leg

Date	Days	DF	Cashflows	PV Cashflows
4/1/2007	0	0.996396		
10/1/2007	183	0.969473	2,659,304.40	2,578,123.82
4/1/2008	183	0.944098	2,659,304.40	2,510,643.97
10/1/2008	183	0.920633	2,659,304.40	2,448,242.06
4/1/2009	182	0.897167	2,659,304.40	2,385,840.15
Fixed Rate		5.319%	NPV:	9,922,850.00

Total swap NPV = Floating NPV – Fixed NPV = 0
With mid-market fixed rate of 5.319%

Procurement: Negotiation/Competition

- Role of swap advisor
 - Usually client knows which way he wants to go
 - Often, we are brought in after the dealer has been chosen – sometimes, much after
 - Client often uses us to confirm his judgment
 - Our experience: 75% of governments use competition (non-profits are reverse)

Why negotiate?

- Comfortable with current banking team, issuer may be inclined to enter into first swap with group they know
- A key financial relationship is overwhelmingly the most common reason clients negotiate swaps

Why negotiate?

- I want to give the business to someone who brought in a great idea
- Much less common, as there are few truly original ideas
 - The best ideas are not original product ideas
 - Instead, they are for ways to apply a product to a client's individual circumstances
 - We believe clients mostly reward bankers who take the time to understand client needs

Why negotiate?

- My deal could move the market if I bid it competitively
- Also less common, but can occur if:
 - Deal is very large
 - Deal is in a relatively illiquid part of the market

Why compete?

- My only goal is best price
- If deal won't move market, competition usually provides best pricing
- Issue: It may take more time to qualify bidders (get agreement on key documentation issues)

Case Study: California DWR

- September 2005
- \$2,594,000,000 (amortizing)
- DWR pays fixed, receives 66% of 1 mo. LIBOR
- Agency wanted to compete broadly, diversify among 5 or more dealers
- Went out to 17 dealers
- Winners were all non-relationship banks
- Agency's key relationships were ticked off

Why compete?

- I need to demonstrate I achieved best price
- Very common reason, esp. in governmental market
- Alternative: Fairness Opinion

Why compete?

- My product is so unusual that fair price is very hard to establish without competition
- Real rarity, but sometimes happens

Case Study: NewYork-Presbyterian

- September 2005 / November 2006
- \$58,775,000 / \$174,990,000
- 30-Year BMA cap: NYP pays upfront premium, receives excess of BMA Index over 6.00% for any month over the next 30 years
- No one ever did a 30-year BMA cap before
- Price estimates varied enormously

Bid results: March 2005

Dealer	30-Year BMA Cap
JPMorgan	367 bps
Bear Stearns	380 bps
BNP Paribas	413 bps
Merrill Lynch	446 bps
Bank of America	468 bps
Bank of New York	471 bps
Lehman Brothers	515 bps

Bid results: November 2006

Dealer	30-Year BMA Cap
Lehman Brothers	241 bps
Royal Bank of Canada	247 bps
BNP Paribas	255 bps
JPMorgan	260 bps
Bear Stearns	274 bps
Bank of New York	291 bps
Merrill Lynch	293 bps
Bank of America	294 bps
Bank of Montreal	329 bps